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Abstract
Since 2000, access to antiretroviral drugs to treat HIV infection has dramatically increased to reach more than five
million people in developing countries. Essential to this achievement was the dramatic reduction in antiretroviral
prices, a result of global political mobilization that cleared the way for competitive production of generic versions
of widely patented medicines.
Global trade rules agreed upon in 1994 required many developing countries to begin offering patents on
medicines for the first time. Government and civil society reaction to expected increases in drug prices precipitated
a series of events challenging these rules, culminating in the 2001 World Trade Organization’s Doha Declaration on
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and Public Health. The Declaration affirmed
that patent rules should be interpreted and implemented to protect public health and to promote access to
medicines for all. Since Doha, more than 60 low- and middle-income countries have procured generic versions of
patented medicines on a large scale.
Despite these changes, however, a “treatment timebomb” awaits. First, increasing numbers of people need access
to newer antiretrovirals, but treatment costs are rising since new ARVs are likely to be more widely patented in
developing countries. Second, policy space to produce or import generic versions of patented medicines is
shrinking in some developing countries. Third, funding for medicines is falling far short of needs. Expanded use of
the existing flexibilities in patent law and new models to address the second wave of the access to medicines
crisis are required.
One promising new mechanism is the UNITAID-supported Medicines Patent Pool, which seeks to facilitate access
to patents to enable competitive generic medicines production and the development of improved products. Such
innovative approaches are possible today due to the previous decade of AIDS activism. However, the Pool is just
one of a broad set of policies needed to ensure access to medicines for all; other key measures include sufficient
and reliable financing, research and development of new products targeted for use in resource-poor settings, and
use of patent law flexibilities. Governments must live up to their obligations to protect access to medicines as a
fundamental component of the human right to health.
Review
Introduction
A decade ago, the world prepared to gather in Durban,
South Africa, for the first International AIDS Confer-
ence to be held on the continent most devastated by
HIV. At the time, the statistics were grim: only one in a
thousand people living with HIV in Africa had access to
AIDS treatment [1]. Antiretroviral (ARV) drugs were
largely available only from the originator companies that
controlled the patents on these medicines, and came
with a paralysing price tag of US$10,000 to $15,000 per
patient per year [2].
With civil society at the forefront [3-8], a joint mobili-
zation of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLHIV), doctors
and nurses, ministries of health, developing country and
donor governments [9-12], intergovernmental organiza-
tions, and pharmaceutical companies [13,14] achieved
today what most delegates at Durban thought impossi-
ble: access to ARVs for more than five million people in
the developing world [15].
This achievement required some essential ingredients:
first, civil society had to put access to treatment for
HIV/AIDS on the global political agenda; second,
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delivering treatment was safe and effective and thus fea-
sible in resource-poor settings; and third, the price of
medicines had to come down. Once these ingredients
were in place, increased funding for ARVs followed, and
investment in strengthening health systems to deliver
treatment and care for all - both HIV positive and HIV
negative - was made possible. Civil society, alongside
courageous leaders willing to take risks, made it happen.
While the achievements have been enormous, huge
challenges remain to sustain the progress made to date
and to meet future needs.
The past 10 years have shown how ARV treatment
can reduce HIV/AIDS-related illness and death in devel-
oping countries. But in the current climate of wavering
support for achieving universal access to treatment, pre-
vention, care and support - a commitment that Member
States made at the UN General Assembly just five years
ago [16,17] - it is necessary to look ahead to consider
how to make an even greater impact.
Overall, ARVs are still underused relative to need, and
they still reach people with too much delay. The latest
World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines for HIV
treatment in resource-poor settings recommend that
people should start treatment when their CD4 cell
counts are above 350 cells/mm
3 rather than 200 [18,19].
Recent guidelines from wealthy countries recommend
even earlier initiation of ARVs, at a CD4 cell count of
500 cells/mm
3 or above [20]. The WHO recommenda-
tion is a critical step toward improving the efficacy of
treatment in developing countries, and is also expected
to help prevent transmission of the virus [21]. However,
it also means that over 14 million people are now in
urgent need of treatment, with more than nine million
still left empty handed in the waiting room.
In order to address this challenge, ARVs should be
more affordable, meet current medical standards, and be
developed or adapted for use in the contexts where they
are needed: that is, in settings with minimal or no moni-
toring available (e.g., for toxicity, viral load, or resis-
tance), where refrigeration may be scarce, and where
health workers are in short supply.
Patents and access to medicines
What role do intellectual property rules and practices
play in this equation? The AIDS crisis has radically
changed conceptions of and policy approaches to
patents on medicines. This shift is reflected in changes
in international treaties, national law, public policies,
and the business practices of pharmaceutical companies.
In order to understand current thinking on HIV medi-
cines patents, we need to look back at least to the
1990s.
In 1996, a group of health non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) met in Bielefeld, Germany, to discuss
the public health implications of new intellectual prop-
erty rules created by the World Trade Organization
(WTO). The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was part of the set
of treaties that established the WTO in 1994, and had
just come into force in 1995. The negotiations leading
to TRIPS had been primarily driven by the trade and
commercial interests of the industrialized nations [7,8].
While developing country negotiators were able to pre-
serve certain flexibilities in the agreement, such as tran-
sition periods for implementation in developing
countries, overall, TRIPS was not focused on public
health, and civil society organizations were not part of
the negotiation process.
T R I P Sr e q u i r e dt h a ta l lW T OM e m b e r s ,w h i c ht o d a y
number 153, provide a minimum standard of intellectual
property protection, and was enforceable through the
WTO dispute settlement procedures. The standards for
intellectual property protection that were globally har-
monized through the TRIPS Agreement derived primar-
ily from practices in the industrialized countries, where
national patent systems had evolved over many years.
While proponents argued that TRIPS would increase
foreign direct investment, technology transfer and
research in the developing countries, critics argued that
it would retard industrialization, hamper technology
transfer and increase the prices of essential goods, such
as medicines and agricultural inputs [4,22-36].
Before TRIPS, pharmaceutical patent policies and
practices were diverse. For example, many countries did
not consider patents on such products as medicines and
food to be in the public interest. Half of the 98 coun-
tries that were members of the 1883 Paris Convention
on the Protection of Industrial Property (a major inter-
national patent treaty prior to TRIPS, now administered
by the World Intellectual Property Organization)
actively excluded pharmaceutical (product) patenting
altogether [37]. Some countries reduced patent terms on
medicines, or only made them available for manufactur-
ing processes but not for the end product. Even among
t h ew e a l t h yc o u n t r i e s ,s o m ed i dn o tg r a n tp r o d u c t
patents on medicines until relatively recently: for exam-
ple, Italy and Sweden began granting pharmaceutical
patents only in 1978 and Spain in 1992 [38].
TRIPS put an end to this diversity when it required all
Members to introduce 20-year patents in all fields of
technology; in practice, this requirement meant that
many developing countries had to begin offering patents
on pharmaceutical products for the first time. Because
TRIPS was part of the WTO package, countries that
wished to remain Members of the WTO could not opt
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many other international agreements). The ensuing
years saw a wave of intellectual property reforms in
most developing countries in response to TRIPS obliga-
tions [32]. The policy space that countries once enjoyed
to design intellectual property systems in line with their
development needs had been dramatically constrained.
In the late 1990s, the potential effect of these new
intellectual property rules on access to medicines was
little understood, and interest in intellectual property
issues among the public health community was still rare.
The tide begins to turn
In early 1998, 41 drug companies and their representa-
tive body sued the new democratic post-apartheid gov-
ernment of South Africa over amendments made in
1997 to its Medicines Act, which aimed to make low-
cost medicines more readily available. The companies
asserted that it was neither constitutional nor in compli-
ance with the TRIPS Agreement [39].
This lawsuit was brought against the backdrop of the
growing AIDS crisis. It came two years after the 1996
International AIDS Conference in Vancouver, Canada,
where the world had learned that highly active antiretro-
viral therapy could transform HIV infection from a dis-
ease with a certain death sentence into a chronic,
manageable condition. However, while ARVs were
becoming available in the industrialized countries, they
remained far out of reach of most South Africans and
others living in developing countries. At the time, South
Africa was (and remains today) home to the largest esti-
mated number of PLHIV in the world.
Big Pharma vs. Nelson Mandela shocked the world’s
conscience. It was a call to action that pulled many dif-
ferent actors onto the stage.
In 1999, at the United Nations in Geneva, a group of
NGOs and AIDS activists held a conference on compul-
sory licensing for HIV medicines. A compulsory licence
is a way to remedy problems caused by a patent,
whereby a government body (such as a ministry, court
or a statutory tribunal) grants a licence to an entity
other than the patent holder, allowing them to produce
the patented product in exchange for “adequate remu-
neration”. It is allowed under the TRIPS Agreement,
which sets out some procedural requirements but leaves
countries free to determine the grounds for issuing a
compulsory licence. Industrialized countries have repeat-
edly used compulsory licensing, including to purchase
low-cost medicines. For example, from 1969 until 1992,
when Canada changed its system as a requirement of
the North American Free Trade Agreement, Canada
granted 613 compulsory licences for the production or
import of generic medicines, leading to some of the
lowest medicines prices in the industrialized world [40].
(A generic drug is a pharmaceutical product, usually
intended to be interchangeable with an innovator
product.)
Today there is nothing revolutionary or newsworthy
about holding a meeting about compulsory licensing
and access to medicines, but in 1999, the situation was
quite different. Discussing compulsory licensing was the
exclusive domain of specialized intellectual property
lawyers. The Geneva meeting gathered NGOs and
health officials to discuss how flexibilities in intellectual
property law, such as compulsory licences, could be
used to increase the availability of low-cost HIV medi-
cines in the developing world. This caused a great deal
of concern among patent holders.
The growing discontent with the public health impli-
cations of TRIPS culminated at the WTO ministerial
conference in Seattle in 1999 with a call to “humanize
the trade agreements”. Advocates from civil society and
developing country governments began forming a strong
coalition and pushed for the use of measures, such as
compulsory licensing, to accelerate the production and
availability of low-cost generic medicines for HIV/AIDS,
without risk of trade retaliation.
At the time, an editorial in the Pharmaceutical
Executive commented: “Unlikely as it seems, the
pharmaceutical industry may have reason to thank the
demonstrators who brought Seattle and the ministerial
meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to a
standstill. Had the demonstrators not disrupted the
gathering, the forecast for global pharma might be
much cloudier (Gopal 2000).”
The period between the failed Seattle WTO Minister-
ial conference in 1999 and the 2001 WTO meeting in
Doha saw a number of developments that had a
profound effect on intellectual property rules and access
to medicines.
Developing countries that were at the forefront of pro-
viding ARV therapy began to experience the conse-
quences of pharmaceutical patents on HIV/AIDS drugs.
For example, in Thailand and Brazil, patents signifi-
cantly limited the legal space to produce lower-cost gen-
erics, resulting in a heavy burden on public health
budgets.
Brazil was the first developing country to provide
widespread access to HIV/AIDS treatment through its
national programme; the Brazilian programme demon-
strated to the world that ARVs could be provided safely
even with limited toxicity and efficacy monitoring [41].
Initially, Brazil’s programme heavily relied on the ability
to produce lower-cost generic versions of ARVs that
were not patented in the country. However, like many
developing countries, in the 1990s, Brazil had come
under strong pressure from wealthy nations to tighten
patent protection, and had amended its national laws to
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years before it was obligated to do so by TRIPS). The
high price of patented drugs soon began to consume
more and more of the ARV budget. At one point in
Brazil, three patented medicines (out of a total of 17)
took up 75% of the AIDS programme’sd r u gb u d g e t
[9,42,43].
A tt h es a m et i m et h a ta w a r e n e s so ft h ep u b l i ch e a l t h
implications of TRIPS was growing, the AIDS crisis also
began to attract greater political attention at the global
level. In 2000, the Group of 8 countries paid unprece-
dented attention to health and the need for action to
increase access to medicines. At the International AIDS
Conference in Durban, the Treatment Action Campaign
and its partners organized the Global March for Treat-
ment, squarely placing access to ARVs on the political
agenda.
In December of that year, a three-day global summit
in Okinawa, Japan, on infectious diseases outlined an
agenda to prevent the spread of AIDS, provide treat-
ment and care for those affected, and to enhance
research and development (R&D) for international pub-
lic goods, including new approaches to managing intel-
lectual property. Most importantly, Okinawa witnessed
the birth of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculo-
sis and Malaria (the Global Fund), a result of extensive
efforts by many advocates to create a new approach to
financing the international response to HIV and other
global health concerns.
Under increasing public pressure to support rather
than hinder efforts to combat the epidemic, the patent-
holding pharmaceutical industry began to respond. In
May 2000, five pharmaceutical companies announced
the Accelerating Access Initiative, offering price dis-
counts on HIV-related medicines and diagnostics in
developing countries [44]. However, even with the dis-
counts, the prices offered through this initiative paled in
comparison with the prices offered by generic
producers.
Generic production of ARVs in India was possible
because the Indian Patents Act did not provide for
patents on pharmaceutical products until required by
TRIPS to do so in 2005. Generic producers competed
with each other to make medicines at prices far lower
than the originators. Indian firms also combined two or
more medicines into one pill in “fixed-dose combina-
tions” (FDCs), a type of innovation facilitated by the
absence of medicines product patents. FDCs are thought
to facilitate patient adherence, reduce the risk of resis-
tance and simplify supply chain management [45-47].
Although Indian firms were not the only ones that pro-
duced three-in-one FDCs, they were the first to produce
the FDC of stavudine, lamivudine and nevirapine, a
first-line regimen recommended by WHO at the time.
The convenience for patients and relatively low price of
this FDC has helped make it the mainstay of many
treatment programmes in developing countries.
In high-income countries, the patents on these three
medicines were controlled by three different companies
(Bristol Myers Squibb, GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer
Ingelheim), which raised the transaction costs of devel-
oping this product. In high-income countries, the first
three-in-one FDC comprised of medicines on which
patents were controlled by different companies was the
combination of tenofovir, emtricitabine and efavirenz
(brand name Atripla). First approved by the US Food
and Drug Administration in 2006, this product has
become the standard of care in recent recommendations
in high-income countries.
In early 2001, the Indian generic medicines producer,
Cipla, offered a triple-combination of ARVs for US$350
per patient per year - or HIV/AIDS treatment for less
than a dollar a day [48]. At the time, originator prices
through the Accelerating Access Initiative were generally
not publicly announced, and eligibility was restricted to
a limited list of developing countries [49]. The lowest
publicly announced originator price for the same combi-
nation of drugs offered by Cipla was about $1000 at the
time, but countries negotiated case-by-case with origina-
tor companies for price discounts, with wide variation in
prices by country [48,50]. In contrast, Cipla publicly
offered its price to all countries. Cipla’sd r a m a t i cp r i c e
reduction, which received widespread media attention,
hammered the message home that many of the multina-
tional drug companies were abusing their market mono-
poly in the face of a catastrophic human disaster. It also
drew attention to the effects of generic competition in
bringing drug prices down. India quickly was becoming
the “pharmacy of the developing world”.
Also in 2001, controversy had broken out over the
cost of the drug stavudine (also known as d4T), which
came to a head on the Yale University campus in
March. Stavudine was developed by researchers at Yale
University, which held the patent on the drug. The price
of the generic version of stavudine in South Africa was
34 times less than the price of the brand-name product
from Bristol Myers Squibb, but the patent prevented its
use in South Africa. Under pressure from researchers,
students and access advocates, Yale renegotiated its
licence with Bristol Myers Sq u i b bt oe n s u r et h ea v a i l -
ability of generic stavudine in developing countries
[51,52].
Meanwhile, the Medicines Act court case in South
Africa was progressing. In early 2001, an amicus curiae
brief filed by the AIDS Law Project on behalf of the
Treatment Action Campaign put the spotlight on access
to ARV treatment and brought the matter to the inter-
national stage. In April 2001, after a global public outcry
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intervention and domestic advocacy campaign, the drug
companies dropped their case against the South African
Government. The landscape had dramatically changed.
Access to medicines and the need to revisit the patent
rules that govern them had become part of a larger poli-
tical agenda, and was no longer the exclusive domain of
trade negotiators or intellectual property lawyers.
In November 2001, governments at the WTO Minis-
terial Conference, in an unprecedented move, adopted
the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. The
Doha Declaration made clear that the TRIPS Agreement
“can and should be interpreted and implemented in a
manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect
public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all [53]“.
This landmark event represented the first significant
push back to the relentless march to strengthen private
intellectual property rights without regard for societal
consequences in poor countries.
Implementing the Doha Declaration
The 500-word Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health has been essential in making lower-cost generic
versions of patented medicines available on a large scale.
In 2003, the WTO adopted the “August 30
th decision”
in an attempt to find a remedy for legal barriers to
exporting sufficient amounts of medicines produced
under a compulsory licence, and to ensure that coun-
tries that rely on import for their medicines supply
could benefit from compulsory licences. Most develop-
ing countries do not have domestic manufacturing capa-
city for ARVs. Although some argued that the absence
of ARV patents in a number of African countries meant
that intellectual property did not pose a barrier to HIV
treatment, this perspective did not take into account the
industrial reality that patents in a few producing coun-
tries (such as India) could hinder access to generic med-
icines in scores of importing countries [54,55]. While
t h es o l u t i o nt h a tw a sa d o p t e di sd e e p l yf l a w e da n d
should be revised, the proposed TRIPS 31bis amend-
ment, which has yet to come into force, is the sole
amendment agreed since 1994 not only to TRIPS itself,
but to the full set of WTO agreements. Public health
concerns in general, and the AIDS crisis in particular,
made this happen.
On 1 December 2003, WHO and the Joint United
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS declared the lack of
HIV/AIDS treatment to be a global public health emer-
gency and announced the launch of a drive to get three
million people on ART by 2005; this was the “3b y5 ”
campaign. The political momentum of the campaign,
combined with newly available funding from govern-
ments, the Global Fund and the US President’s
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), allowed
countries to begin purchasing HIV/AIDS medicines in
significant volumes.
By 2010, such purchases were predominantly generic
drugs [56]. For example, by 2008, 95% (by volume) of
the global donor-funded ARV market was comprised of
generics, primarily from India [57]. The generic propor-
tion of PEPFAR-purchased ARVs grew from 15% to 89%
from 2005 to 2008, with estimated savings to PEPFAR
totalling $323 million over the four-year period [58].
How did countries manage the potential barriers
posed by patents? While Thailand and Brazil’sc o m p u l -
sory licences for ARVs in 2006 and 2007 have been
widely publicized, it is perhaps less widely known that
over 60 developing countries have procured lower-cost
medicines on a large scale using TRIPS flexibilities
[4,43,59]. Of these, 17 low- and middle-income coun-
tries have issued compulsory licences or government use
licences to gain access to generic ARVs, including, most
recently, Ecuador in 2010. Twenty-six out of 32 least
developed country WTO members authorized importa-
tion of generic ARVs with reference to Paragraph 7 of
the Doha Declaration, which allowed them to delay
granting or enforcing medicines patents until at least
2016 [4]. However, some countries, such as South
Africa, have yet to make use of such flexibilities.
In other cases, the policy space for countries to use
such flexibilities is being constrained by stringent intel-
lectual property requirements that exceed TRIPS and
are contained in bilateral or regional free trade agree-
ments, investment treaties and/or WTO accession
agreements [60]. Middle-income developing countries
that are seen as potentially lucrative emerging markets,
in particular, have been subject to strong bilateral pres-
sure from industrialized countries to refrain from using
TRIPS flexibilities. Despite these persistent pressures,
however, the use of TRIPS flexibilities to access generic
medicines has been widespread and represents a major
normative and policy shift from 2000.
Many countries could import generic ARVs, largely
b e c a u s eI n d i ac o u l dp r o d u c ea n de x p o r tt h e m[ 5 7 ] .
There was great concern in the public health commu-
nity when India had to begin granting pharmaceutical
patents in 2005 under its TRIPS obligations. However,
the Indian Parliament incorporated public health safe-
guards in its Patents Act, including strict patentability
criteria and the possibility for anyone to oppose the
granting of patents. PLHIV supported by the Lawyers
Collective used these safeguards successfully to oppose
patents on HIV/AIDS medicines that did not fulfill the
patentability criteria that India had adopted. A challenge
to these provisions by one drug company (Novartis),
which did not receive a patent for its cancer drug (Gli-
vec), was rejected [61-63].
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by agreeing to voluntary licences to their patents. For
example, GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer-Ingelheim
expanded their voluntary licences in South Africa as
part of a settlement reached after the AIDS Law Project,
acting on behalf of the Treatment Action Campaign and
others, had filed a successful complaint with the South
African Competition Commission [64,65]. Companies
have also made voluntary licences available in response
to the threat of non-voluntary measures, such as com-
pulsory licences and patent oppositions [66]. Such
licences are critical because they can encourage robust
competition among drug manufacturers; competition
drove down first-line regimen prices by 99% over the
past decade, from $10,000 to as low as $67 per patient
per year [67].
In short, the AIDS crisis has been an engine for
change. These changes extend beyond the field of intel-
lectual property and access to medicines, and also
include:
￿ Increasing political attention for global health well
beyond HIV and AIDS
￿ Strengthening the role of civil society in decision
making in health policy
￿ Bringing about new financing mechanisms, such as
the Global Fund, PEPFAR and UNITAID, whose
beneficiaries go beyond HIV and AIDS
￿ Catalyzing other innovative approaches to finan-
cing development, such as the “Robin Hood tax” [68]
￿ Expanding healthcare delivery through task shifting
from doctors to nurses and/or community health
workers [69,70]
￿ Empowering patients through treatment literacy,
and putting PLHIV at the centre of their own
treatment
￿ Catalyzing the establishment of access strategies by
the pharmaceutical industry
￿ Establishing the WHO Prequalification Pro-
gramme, which helped create the market for low-
cost generics by providing quality-assurance and a
level playing field for competitors [56]
￿ Improving the standard of care for chronic condi-
tions in resource-limited settings.
Changing approaches to R&D
The HIV/AIDS crisis and AIDS activists also impacted
the way R&D for new medicines is carried out. Since
the 1980s, when the US National Institutes of Health
was investing in the development of the first AIDS
drugs, PLHIV developed scientific expertise on the
virus, clinical trials, research methods and promising
candidates for drug development. For example, activists
demanded greater freedom to decide which risks they
were willing or unwilling to take with experimental
therapies, and challenged what they saw as the slow
pace of regulatory decisions at the US Food and Drug
Administration [71]. In addition, by calling into question
the legitimacy of global intellectual property rules and
their impact on access to medicines in developing coun-
tries, the AIDS crisis also helped to spur new thinking
on how to generate R&D that would meet the needs of
the world’s poor.
A patent can be understood as a type of social con-
tract: in exchange for exclusive rights, patent holders are
expected to provide benefits, such as innovation, to
society. If, however, these benefits are not forthcoming
or not widely available, the contract is not being fulfilled
[72]. In the conventional model, R&D priorities are dri-
ven primarily by the potential profitability of the market
for a medicine. This means that the health needs of
those who do not comprise a sufficiently attractive mar-
k e t-b e c a u s et h e ya r et o op o o ro rt o of e w-w i l lb e
neglected.
Between 1975 and 2004, of the 1556 new chemical
entities marketed globally, only 20 (1.3%) new drugs
were for tropical diseases and tuberculosis, diseases that
account for 12% of the total disease burden [73]. In
2006, the WHO Commission on Intellectual Property,
Innovation and Public Health concluded that “there is
no evidence that the implementation of the TRIPS
Agreement in developing countries will significantly
boost R&D in pharmaceuticals on Type II and particu-
larly Type III diseases. Insufficient market incentives are
the decisive factor [74].” (Type II diseases are incident
in both rich and poor countries, but with a substantial
proportion of the cases in poor countries. Type III dis-
eases are those that are overwhelmingly or exclusively
incident in developing countries.)
A number of new initiatives have been launched to
address the problem of insufficient research into the
neglected diseases. These include more than two dozen
public-private product development partnerships, such
as the Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative [75] and a
“priority review voucher” from the US Food and Drug
Administration, awarded for the development of a new
pharmaceutical for a neglected tropical disease (the vou-
cher can be applied to any new drug application to
speed up regulatory review time) [76,77]. At the global
level, two years of intergovernmental negotiations culmi-
nated in the 2008 Global Strategy and Plan of Action on
Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property,
adopted at the 2008 World Health Assembly [78].
The search is on for new ways to generate needs-
driven medical innovation that will meet the needs of
both the world’s rich and poor. Indeed, the crisis in
innovation is not limited to developing countries or
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patent protection has increased over the past 20 years,
the rate of pharmaceutical innovation has fallen, with an
increasing number of “me-too drugs” of little or no
therapeutic gain. Prescrire International found that 68%
of the 3096 new products approved in France between
1981 and 2004 offered “nothing new” over previously
available medicines. Furthermore, an analysis of more
than 1000 new drugs approved by the US FDA between
1989 and 2000 found that more than three-fourths have
no therapeutic benefit over existing products [79].
While patents can provide incentives for innovation if
sufficient market prospects exist, granting too many
intellectual property rights may also impede rather than
accelerate innovation by creating a “tragedy of the anti-
commons” [80,81]. At the same time, the high prices of
medicines that result from the current innovation sys-
tem raise ongoing access barriers and serious ethical
concerns.
Furthermore, recent improvements in access to first-
line ARVs should not mask the need for additional
research in this field. The gold standard three-in-one
FDC (of tenofovir, emtricitabine and efavirenz) still can-
not be used during early pregnancy because of the
potential first trimester teratogenicity of efavirenz. In
addition, the current widely used regimen (which is
nevirapine-based) is not suitable for treatment in the
early stages of HIV infection due to increased toxicity.
While tuberculosis (TB) remains the most frequent
opportunistic infection of HIV/AIDS, using ARVs in
combination with TB drugs is still a challenge. Regimens
for patients for whom first-line therapy is failing are still
expensive, inconvenient and carry side effects and
potential interactions with multiple other drugs, making
their use impractical. Economic incentives are insuffi-
cient for the industry to develop child-friendly drug
formulations. Finally, implementing WHO’s new recom-
mendations for earlier initiation of ARV therapy in both
children and adults will require an expanded drug
formulary geared towards addressing a generalized epi-
demic. Products should ideally be heat stable, require
minimal monitoring, and offer simplified dosing and
other features that facilitate adherence.
How can we address these interrelated problems of
market-driven R&D priority setting, declining innovation
and high medicines prices? A number of new proposals
have been put on the table, and are being debated and/
or pilot tested, including: rewarding innovation based on
therapeutic value; prize funds to attract new “solvers” to
a problem; guaranteeing markets for end products;
open-source collaborative drug discovery; and an R&D
treaty [82-88]. While a full discussion of these proposals
is beyond the scope of this article, and many cannot be
fully evaluated for years to come, it is worth pointing
out several lessons from the experience of HIV/AIDS.
First, competitive production of medicines has consis-
tently proven to be the most powerful and reliable way
to reduce drug prices to their lowest sustainable levels
[67,89]. New innovation models that can “de-link” the
market for medicines production from the market for
R&D - such that R&D costs do not need to be recuper-
ated through high prices but are rewarded through
other mechanisms - hold the promise of helping to
address affordability issues [90].
Second, public involvement in and funding for
research plays a key role in accelerating scientific pro-
gress. Governments need to invest sufficiently in medi-
cal R&D. For example, additional funding is needed to
conduct further research on promising tenofovir-con-
taining vaginal microbicides to reduce the risk of HIV
transmission - a product that offers the important bene-
fit of being woman-initiated and controlled [91].
Third, PLHIV engagement played a central role in
overcoming both innovation and access barriers with
respect to treatment for HIV/AIDS. New approaches to
generating innovation and ensuring widespread access
to the fruits of scientific progress should prioritize the
engagement of people directly affected by a disease.
The “treatment timebomb”
With all of the progress of the past decade in scaling up
access to ARVs, what is the problem? Unfortunately, the
challenges ahead are formidable and many.
First, the cost of treatment is increasing again because
new ARVs are likely to be more widely patented in
developing countries and thus more expensive. Even
with the high patentability standards implemented in
India and other countries, some of the new ARVs are
likely to be patented. Without production sources, the
countries that rely on importation will find it hard to
source low-cost medicines. In addition, patents on indi-
vidual medicines can make it more difficult to develop
new FDCs.
Second, increasing numbers of people will need access
to new-generation ARVs: an expanded drug formulary is
urgently needed. In addition, about two-thirds of people
in need of treatment still do not receive first-line medi-
cines today. ARV prices, particularly in some middle-
income developing countries, can still put them out of
reach of the people who need them. There is wide varia-
tion in the voluntary licensing practices of the patent-
holding companies, and such licences too often come
with limitations that hamper the full effect of generic
competition and the ability to develop FDCs.
Third, advances in research on newer drugs and com-
binations need to be available worldwide. For example,
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becoming available in resource-limited settings, but
experience on how to use it without monitoring or in
specific populations (e.g., people with renal damage) is
lacking. To avert such situations, research should be
carried out in the specific contexts, and taking into
account the specific co-morbidities of the target popula-
tions where medicines are needed. Some drugs, such as
raltegravir, elvitegravir or rilpivirine, are promising, but
long-term follow up regarding adverse events is lacking,
and the feasibility of their use for treating TB co-
infected patients is unclear at this stage.
Fourth, the policy space to produce or import generic
versions of patented medicines is shrinking in some
developing countries. Stringent intellectual property pro-
visions exceeding TRIPS requirements ("TRIPS-plus”)
have been negotiated into free trade agreements
between industrialized and developing countries, and/or
investment and WTO accession agreements. Measures,
such as patent term extensions, data exclusivity, patent-
registration linkage and border enforcement require-
ments, can all delay access to generics by lengthening,
strengthening or broadening monopolies on medicines
[60,92-94]. In addition, some agreements contain mea-
sures that confuse legitimate generics with counterfeit
medicines; such policies can undermine public health by
restricting access to affordable, quality-assured generic
medicines [95-99]. Countries that enter into agreements
that undermine access to medicines are arguably violat-
ing their international human rights obligations
[100,101].
Fifth, we are faced with a serious financial crisis that
risks setting back the treatment achievements of the
past 10 years.
In July 2009, the United Kingdom All Party Parlia-
mentary Group on AIDS called this situation a “treat-
ment timebomb” a n dc a l l e df o r“political activism” to
“ensure that the next generation of drugs is available to
the world’s poorest in future [102]“.
New approaches to managing intellectual property: the
Medicines Patent Pool
We need to go further than where we are today. We
need expanded use of the existing flexibilities in patent
law and new models to address the second wave of the
access crisis. Without generic competition, prices for
newer drugs will not come down the same way that
they did for the first generation of medicines. One pro-
mising new mechanism is the Medicines Patent Pool,
established with the support of UNITAID.
UNITAID is a new financing mechanism based on a
small solidarity levy on airline tickets, and is supported
by 29 countries, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation,
NGOs and communities. Its mission is to increase
access to treatment for HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria by
making markets work better for health. UNITAID has
raised approximately US$1.5 billion, and seeks to be
innovative in the way that it both raises and spends
funds [103,104].
It is UNITAID’s overarching principle to make mar-
kets work better for health that made it a natural birth-
place for the Medicines Patent Pool Initiative, which
became operational in mid-2010. The idea for an HIV
medicines patent pool was first launched at the 2002
International AIDS Conference in Barcelona, Spain, by
James Love from Knowledge Ecology International. He
had studied the US airplane patent pool that was estab-
lished in 1917 by the US Government to overcome
patent barriers to the mass production of airplanes
needed for the military [105]. He suggested doing the
same for HIV medicines patents.
The Medicines Patent Pool is a response to the chan-
ged global intellectual property environment in which
medicines are being more widely patented in developing
countries. It is built on the principle of relying on mar-
ket competition to bring medicines prices down. How-
ever, robust competition is possible only if licences are
available.
The Pool is expected to work as follows:
Patent holders will make licences available through the
Pool that will allow others to produce low-cost generic
versions of patented ARVs for use in developing coun-
tries. It will be important that the licences cover as
many developing countries as possible, both to maxi-
mize public health benefit and to ensure economies of
scale in generic drug production. The licences are also
intended to facilitate the development of FDCs and
other formulations adapted for use in resource-poor set-
tings, such as special formulations for treating children,
by ensuring that patents do not block generic companies
or product development initiatives from carrying out
follow-on R&D.
Companies that receive licences from the pool will pay
royalties on their sales to the patent holders. The Pool
will be a systematic and predictable way of making
voluntary licences available, offering legal certainty to all
parties involved. No change in international or national
law is required for the Pool to work; what is required is
ac h a n g ei nm i n d s e tf r o mt h ep a t e n th o l d e r s ,w i t h o u t
whose collaboration this initiative cannot succeed. In
other words, the Patent Pool will work only if patent
holders are willing to collaborate to make their intellec-
tual property available to the Pool. Several major leading
patent holders have expressed an interest and willing-
ness to engage with the Pool.
In addition, companies have increasingly adopted
voluntary licensing practices as part of their access poli-
cies; voluntary measures, such as the Pool, may provide
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patent holders, and can be understood as one outcome
of the decade-long evolution in approaches to managing
intellectual property and access to medicines. In
September 2010, the US National Institutes of Health
became the first patent holder to licence its patents
(related to a class of ARVs) to the newly established
Medicines Patent Pool [106].
Despite these recent developments, the Pool faces
many challenges and many key factors have yet to be
determined [107-111]. Nevertheless, it provides a clear
illustration of the considerable normative shift that has
taken place regarding how intellectual property should
be handled relative to access to medicines and the cen-
tral role played by the AIDS crisis in driving forward
these debates.
Conclusions
New approaches to achieving innovation and access to
medicines are possible today because of the previous
decade of activism that demanded a change in the way
we approach intellectual property and public health.
The political and civil society mobilization catalyzed by
HIV/AIDS was at the forefront of these changes. But
three warnings merit attention at this point.
First, initiatives such as the Pool are only one
approach to addressing access issues, and must be seen
as complements to a broad set of other policies that are
needed to ensure access to medicines for all. The
Pool is not a panacea, and governments must live up to
their responsibilities to protect the health of their
populations.
Second, overcoming intellectual property barriers to
innovation and competitive production is critical, but is
only one piece of the complex machinery required to
ensure that we achieve our shared objective of universal
access to treatment, care and prevention services for
HIV/AIDS. Improving access to medicines also requires
addressing regulatory issues, strengthening procurement
and supply chains, and establishing pharmacovigilence
systems, among other measures. In particular, sufficient
levels of funding are critical. Without a market for even
the lowest-cost medicines, we cannot expect that anyone
will be ready to develop and produce these products.
Third, while there may be progress in key aspects of
HIV treatment, needs for the development of new pro-
ducts (such as microbicides) and access to medicines for
other diseases remain immense. For example, treatment
is often unavailable in many developing countries for
both acute infectious diseases and chronic diseases, such
as diabetes and cancer [112-114]. Progress against one
disease should not allow us to be complacent, nor
should it overshadow the scale of ongoing unmet needs.
The struggle for improved access to medicines has
been and will be a continuous fight, sometimes an uphill
battle, and not always easy to win. But the lessons of the
past 10 years show what can be achieved if we mobilize.
We are at a crucial point in time: not only do we need
to protect what has been achieved, but we also need to
be ambitious and go further. It is feasible that with bet-
ter-adapted, more affordable ARVs, we can double or
triple the number of people on treatment without dou-
bling or tripling the cost. We can also ensure that peo-
ple have access to better and better-tolerated medicines.
High prices simply cannot be legitimate grounds for
withholding lifesaving treatment from people. Access to
medicines is a fundamental human right [100,115],
which puts the obligation on all of us to do all we can
to ensure that it is fully realized.
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